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 1.  Introduction  
One of Paul A. Samuelson’s (1954) motivations to write out his seminal model of public 
goods was his dissatisfaction with the fundamental meaning of the Lindahl (1919) model (see 
Pickhardt 2006a, p. 450). Samuelson maintained that agents would not voluntarily contribute 
to public goods because that would be against their own self-interest (1954, p. 388-389). In 
modern terms, this is shown with the prisoner’s dilemma where the dominant strategy of 
rational,  payoff  maximizing  agents  is  not  to  contribute  to  public  goods.  Therefore, 
neoclassical public goods theory of the Samuelson-Musgrave type argues that the government 
should step in and use its power to tax so that the necessary means for providing public goods 
could be raised. In contrast, Lindahl’s (1919) model is based on the implicit assumption that 
for one reason or another all agents reveal their true preferences. Under these circumstances a 
voluntary bargaining process may lead to a Pareto-optimal provision of public goods (see 
Musgrave 1939, p. 216).  
From a behavioral perspective, however, both models represent extreme cases because 
they are based on the assumption that all agents are of just one behavioral type. Yet, ample 
experimental evidence from public goods games in the laboratory and from field experiments 
suggests  that  there  are  several  behavioral  patterns  and  types,  including  those  that  fit  the 
Samuelson and Lindahl models (e.g. see Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Herrmann and Thöni 
2009; Fischbacher et. al. 2001; Ledyard 1995). Experimental researchers are spending a great 
deal of effort on identifying possible motivations for such behavior patterns. Another question 
of interest concerns the conditions under which different behavioral types may interact in a 
way that leads to positive provision levels or even a Pareto-optimal provision of public goods. 
Reciprocal  action,  conditional  cooperation,  other-regarding  preferences,  etc.  are  topics  of 
interest here (e.g. see Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Croson 2007; Frey and Meier 2004; 
Brandt and Schram 2001; Fischbacher et al. 2001). Yet, in experimental settings identification 
of  the  exact  behavioral  type  of  a  human  subject  before  the  actual  experiment,  say  via   3
questionnaires  or  pre-testing,  is  associated  with  various  problems,  in  particular,  when  the 
entire subject pool is of interest. In contrast, an agent-based approach allows for a perfect 
control of the behavioral types and their shares in the subject pool, even if the subject pool is 
rather  large.  Also,  running  experiments  with  human  subjects  for  a  large  set  of  different 
parameter  values  may  be  rather  costly.  For  these  reasons,  I  am  using  an  agent-based 
simulation where the impact and the interaction of different, a priori defined, behavioral types 
can be analyzed (for an overview and introduction to agent-based modeling see Tesfatsion 
and Judd 2006; for the link between agent-based models and human subject experiments see 
Duffy 2006). 
In particular, the purpose of this paper is to examine the influence which a population of 
different behavioral types may have on the provision of public goods, if one agent type shows 
ethically motivated behavior patterns. The paper proceeds as follows. In section two I first 
describe the set of behavioral types I consider. Next, I briefly discuss a simple linear public 
goods game which is frequently used in experimental settings and which I use here, among 
other things, as a framework to distinguish Pareto-optimal allocations from Pareto-suboptimal 
allocations. In section three I then introduce a model of behavioral type interaction that may 
increase the level of public good provision and may even lead to a Pareto-optimal provision 
level of public goods. Simulation results are provided in section four and in the following 
section I discuss these results and the underlying driving forces. Finally, in section six I offer 
a  few  extensions  of  the  basic  type  interaction  model.  The  last  section  summarizes  and 
concludes.  
 
2. Behavioral types and public goods provision 
Over the last three decades experimental researchers have accumulated a considerable amount 
of empirical evidence on the behavior of human subjects from laboratory experiments with 
public goods (e.g. see  Hold and  Laury 2008; Zelmer 2003;  Ledyard  1995). According to   4
Ledyard (1995, p. 173), casual observation suggests that many subject pools consist of three 
different types: (a) those who are always prepared to free ride if that promises higher benefits 
than contributing, (b) those who sometimes free ride and sometimes contribute to the public 
good, and (c) those who always contribute to the public good. Often the relative shares of 
these subgroups are in the range of 50, 40 and 10 percent, respectively (Ledyard 1995, p. 
173). As these three behavioral types and their relative shares continue to show up in more 
recent work on public goods games (e.g. see Herrmann and Thöni 2009; Pickhardt 2005a; 
Burlando and Guala 2005; Kurzban and Houser 2001; Fischbacher et al. 2001), I use these 
behavioral types in the following.  
Accordingly, the behavior patterns of a-type agents are characterized by myopic selfish 
behavior, that is, in a linear public goods game they always free ride and never contribute to 
the public good. Agents that show a b-type behavior pattern may either contribute to the 
public  good  or  may  decide  not  to  contribute  to  the  public  good.  A  number  of  different 
motivations have been put forward to explain such behavior patterns. In this paper, however, I 
assume that b-types contribute to the public good because they have recognized that they may 
maximize their long-run payoff by contributing, if certain conditions hold. To this extent, 
their behavior is forward-looking and in line with the modeling approach of Isaac et al. (1994, 
pp.  21–26).  In  particular,  b-types  contribute  in  the  short-run  if  and  only  if  others  are 
contributing as well. In this sense they are conditional cooperators. However, they continue to 
contribute  in  the  long-run  if  and  only  if  they  are  better  off  by  contributing,  that  is,  if 
‘cooperative gain seeking’ is successful. It is for this reason that I describe b-type behavior as 
enlightened  selfish  behavior.  Isaac  et  al.  (1994)  and  Brandts  and  Schram  (2001)  provide 
experimental evidence for such b-type behavior patterns in linear public goods games and 
Farina and Sbriglia (2008, p. 164) find experimental evidence for such behavior patterns in a 
sequential move game.    5
Finally, agents that show a c-type behavior pattern will always contribute to the public 
good, irrespective of the consequences that may have for their own individual payoff in either 
the  short-run  or  long-run.  The  behavior  of  c-type  agents  may  be  explained  with  ethical 
motivations. For example, c-types may regard contributing as their duty in a Kantian sense. 
Although they may incur an individual loss in terms of their own payoffs, they continue to 
contribute  to  the  public  good  in  all  rounds  irrespectively  of  the  consequences  (e.g.  see 
Figuieres et al. 2009, pp. 6-8; Croson 2007, pp. 201–202; Bordignon 1990; Laffont 1975; for 
modeling Kantian behavior). Altruistic motivations may serve as an alternative explanation of 
the c-type behavior pattern (e.g. see Croson 2007, pp. 202–203; Fender 1998; Andreoni 1989, 
1990).  I  shall  come  back  to  these  alternative  ethical  motivations  later  on.  Regarding  the 
provision of public goods, two conclusions can immediately be drawn from this frequently 
observed group composition.  
 
(i)   Any group of individuals that contains a non-empty set of c-type agents will 
provide itself with a positive provision level (PPL) of public goods. 
  
(ii)  Interaction between b-type and c-type agents may allow a group of individuals 
that  contains  non-empty  sets  of  a-,  b-  and  c-types  to  provide  itself  with  a 
Pareto-optimal provision level of public goods.  
 
To be sure, ‘itself’ here means that no external force such as the government with its power to 
tax is needed and that the provision is, therefore, voluntary, ‘public goods’ refers to goods 
consumed in a nonrival manner and public goods provision may be suboptimal, unless type 
interaction  or  a  sufficient  number  of  c-types  within  the  group  leads  to  a  Pareto-optimal 
provision level for the group.    6
To proceed, I now introduce a simple linear public goods game that is frequently used in 
experimental  economics  (e.g.  see  Batina  and  Ihori  2005;  Pickhardt  2005a;  Zelmer  2003). 
Within this framework, I then analyze the effects of group composition and type interaction. I 
assume a group of n agents with each agent facing the following linear payoff function: 
 
  Ui =5yi + 2X ,                   (1) 
 
where Ui denotes the payoff of the i-th agent in terms of tokens, yi represents the quantity of 
the private good and X is the quantity of the public good. Each agent has a given endowment 
or budget Bi of two resource units per round. Hence, in principle, each agent may contribute 0, 
1, or 2 resource units to either the private or public good. But for simplicity alone, I now 
follow Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), McCrokle and Watts (1996) or Isaac et al. (1994, 
pp. 21–23) and assume a binary contribution environment in which agents contribute both 
units either exclusively to the private good yi or to the public good xi in order to maximize 
payoff:  
 
  i B = 2 = yi + xi ,      yi , xi Î {0, 2}, yi ≠ xi.           (2) 
 









.                     (3) 
 
Also, the public good X can be consumed in a non-rival manner by all n agents and from now 
on I consider a group of five agents, with n = 5.  
   7
  X = Xi ,  " i.                  (4) 
 
Inspection of the public good model, equations (1) to (4), shows that it gives each agent an 
incentive to free ride completely, that is, to invest its entire endowment into the private good 
and nothing into the public good. Hence, it is the dominant strategy not to contribute to the 
public good, but the resulting non-cooperative equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. In fact, such 
a prisoner’s dilemma situation arises whenever the following condition holds:  
 
  1/n < MPCR < 1                  (5) 
 
where MPCR is the marginal per capita return of a contribution to the public good (e.g. see 
Croson 2007, p. 200). In general, the MPCR is the marginal rate of substitution and, therefore, 
the marginal incentive to contribute to the public good (see Ledyard 1995, p. 149). Based on 
this definition it follows from (1) that the MPCR amounts to: (2/5) = 0.4. Hence, because of n 
= 5 condition (5) holds with: 0.2 < 0.4 < 1.  
Moreover, for a group of n agents, it follows from (1) and (4) that the social payoff for a 
unit increase in X is 2n tokens, whereas the private cost is five tokens. Hence, with n = 5 the 
group gains (2·5 – 5 =) 5 tokens for every resource unit that is invested into the public instead 
of the private good. Put differently, with n = 5 each unit of resources contributed to the public 
good generates a social net gain of (10 – 2 =) 8 tokens and an individual net loss of (5 – 2 =) 3 
tokens, which amounts to an overall net gain of five tokens per resource unit for the group. In 
this context it is worth noting that altruists would always be better off, if they contribute their 
two resource units to the public good, which gives an overall net gain for society of (8·2–3·2 
=) 10 tokens per contributor. To this extent, as noted above, the behavior of the c-types may 
comply with altruistic behavior patterns as well as Kantian behavior patterns (see also Croson 
2007, pp. 201–203).    8
Following Pickhardt (2005a, p. 147), Table 1 shows the set of feasible allocations, if there 
are five agents in a group and each agent can either choose not to contribute (i.e., yi = 2, xi = 
0) or choose to contribute to the public good (i.e., yi = 0, xi =2). In addition, Table 1 shows the 
payoff each agent receives and the aggregate payoff for the group of five, subject to the linear 
public goods model described in equations (1) to (4). For example, consider allocation II in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Set of feasible allocations and payoffs (in tokens) 
Allocation 
Individual and Aggregate Payoff  Overall Payoff 
Non-Contributors 





I  5 · 10   ---  50 
II  4 · 14  1 · 4  60 
III  3 · 18  2 · 8  70 
IV  2 · 22  3 · 12  80 
V  1 · 26  4 · 16  90 
VI  ---  5 · 20  100 
Note: Allocation denotes the numbers of the six conceivable allocations. Individual and 
Aggregate Payoff denotes the individual and aggregate payoffs for Non-Contributors and 
Contributors. In particular, column two denotes the individual and aggregate payoff received 
by non-contributors in terms of tokens, where nk denotes the number of agents who keep their 
endowment and do not contribute to the public good and Uik denotes the individual payoff 
which each non-contributing agent receives and the product (nk·Uik) denotes the aggregate 
payoff (result not displayed). Likewise, column three denotes the individual and aggregate 
payoff received by contributors in terms of tokens, with np denoting the number of agents who 
provide their endowment and contribute to the public good and Uip is the individual payoff 
which each contributing agent receives. Overall payoff, which can be interpreted as the 
welfare level, denotes the sum of aggregate payoffs received by non-contributors and 
contributors. 
 
Here four agents choose not to contribute to the public good and keep their resources instead 
for  the  private  good  (yi  =  2,  xi  =  0;  i  =  1,  ...,  4),  whereas  the  fifth  agent  contributes  its   9
resources to the public good (y5 = 0, x5 = 2). According to (3) this yields X = 2, and according 
to (1) and (4) each of the four non-contributing agents has a payoff of (5·2 + 2·2 =) 14 tokens, 
whereas the contributing agent has a payoff of (5·0 + 2·2 =) 4 tokens, so that the overall 
payoff or welfare level is (4·14 + 1·4 =) 60 tokens. Furthermore, once allocation VI prevails, 
an agent would maximize its own payoff by deviating from contributing because this yields 
(5·2 + 2·8 =) 26 tokens for the deviating agent according to allocation V, which is higher than 
the (5·0 + 2·10 =) 20 tokens the agent would get according to allocation VI. Thus, Table 1 
illustrates the prevailing prisoner’s dilemma where the dominant strategy is not to contribute 
to the public good.  
Inspection of Table 1 also reveals that if any of the allocations I, II or III prevails, at least 
one other allocation exists in the set of feasible allocations that makes one or more agents 
better off without making any other agent worse off. For example, if allocation II prevails, 
allocations V and VI would both make the four non-contributors, who get 14 in II, and the 
contributor, who gets 4 in II, better off. Yet, if any of the allocations IV, V or VI prevails, no 
such allocation exists because at least one agent will be worse off. Hence, allocations IV, V 
and VI are Pareto-optimal (shaded area in Table 1). In contrast, allocations I, II and III are not 
Pareto-optimal, with allocation I representing the unique non-cooperative equilibrium. This 
makes it clear that contrary to other tools, Table 1 allows for identifying all existing Pareto-
optimal allocations and the associated welfare levels. Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) develop a 
generalized method for calculating Table 1 that can be applied to any conceivable parameter 
constellation.  Among  other  things,  they  also  show  that  the  binary  decision  case  does  not 
restrict the generality of the results. 
Finally, because every resource unit invested into the public good increases welfare by 
five tokens, column four of Table 1 (overall payoff or welfare) shows that every additional 
agent who contributes its entire endowment to the public good increases welfare by (2·5 =) 10   10
tokens and that welfare is increased by 50 tokens in total, if all 10 resource units are invested 
into the public good (allocation VI versus I).  
 
3. Type interaction and Pareto-optimal provision  
I now assume an agent population of size s that consists of the three behavioral types a, b, and 
c,  as  defined  above.  This  population  could  be  interpreted  as  the  subject  pool  of  an 
experimental laboratory or the inhabitants of a village, etc. Next, and in line with the linear 
public goods model introduced in the previous section, I assume that groups of five agents are 
drawn from this population. In this case, 21 different group compositions are conceivable. 
Table 2 shows these 21 group compositions in descending order with respect to the maximum 
number of identical types per group (see Table 2, columns one and two). Note, however, that 
actual  occurrence  of  all  21  groups  implies  that  the  number  of  each  agent  type  in  the 
population sa, sb, sc, with s = sa + sb + sc, is sufficiently large with respect to the group size n. 





× = n s (                     (6) 
 
where r is the percentage of the smallest type share. For example, consider the case where the 
types  a,  b,  and  c  are  distributed  in  the  population  with  shares  of  50%,  40%  and  10%, 
respectively. In this case, the smallest type share is the c-type share with 10% and, thus,  s (  is 
(5 · 1/0.1 =) 50 and the absolute type shares are: sa = 25, sb = 20, sc = 5. This ensures that all 
21  group  constellations  shown  in  Table  2  may  actually  be  drawn  from  the  population, 
including group three, where all five agents are of type c. In contrast, if a population size 
below  s (  is chosen, say s = 30, absolute type shares are: sa = 15, sb = 12, sc = 3, and group 
three could never be drawn because there are only three c-types in the population. Therefore,   11
the population size s must be equal to or larger than the minimal population size  s (  and, in 
addition, it must be ensured that the number of agents of each type can be represented by an 
integer. Hence, for the two relevant type distributions shown in Table 2, that is, 50/40/10 
percent  and  equal  distribution,  the  minimal  population  sizes  are  s (   =  50  and  s ( =  15, 
respectively. But to keep the two simulations shown in Table 2 comparable, I have used s = 
60  for  both  simulations.  This  population  size  ensures  that  the  minimal  population  size  is 
respected  in  both  cases  and  gives  integers  for  all  absolute  type  shares,  i.e.  (30/24/6)  and 
(20/20/20), with (sa/sb/sc). 
The  next  step  consists  of  identifying  the  allocation  that  emerges  for  each  group 
composition in the long-run. To do so, the contribution to the public good must be predicted 
for  each  type  of  agent.  Given  the  above  definitions  and  assumptions,  a-type  agents  will 
always contribute zero, that is,
a i x = 0, " ia. Likewise, c-type agents will always contribute 
two, that is,
c i x  = 2, " ic. Regarding the b-types, however, predicting their contribution is a bit 
more complex. Due to the first condition mentioned above, they will never contribute in the 
first round, because in  a simultaneous move  game they  cannot figure  out whether or not 
others contribute as well. To this extent, the first round serves to reveal the number of c-types 
within the group of five agents. For simplicity, I now specify that each b-type will contribute 
in round two if at least one other agent has contributed in round one (first condition). In other 
words, if there is at least one c-type in the group of five. However, b-types will continue to 
contribute in round three if and only if the second condition is fulfilled. In the present context, 
b-types  will  contribute  if  their  payoff  in  the  previous  round  (here  round  two,  with 
contributing) was higher than in round one (without contributing) (second condition). 
Inspection of Table 1 shows that this condition may hold only in cases where the group of 
five contains one or two c-types. The reasoning is as follows: 1) if there is no c-type in the 
group, b-types will not contribute in round two and in all further rounds because of the first 
condition, 2) if there are more than two c-types in the group (i.e. three or four c-types), the   12
allocation in round one will already be Pareto-optimal (i.e. allocations IV or V, respectively), 
and although b-types will contribute in round two because of condition one, inspection of 
Table 1 shows that contributing cannot make them better off than in the first round and, 
therefore, the second condition is not fulfilled so that b-types do not contribute in round three. 
Hence, condition two requires nc Î {1, 2}. 
Moreover,  even if the  group under consideration contains just one or two c-types, by 
inspection of Table 1 it can be shown that the second condition also requires that there are 
three or more b-types in the group. For example, if there are three b-types, one a-type and one 
c-type in the group (see group 15, Table 2), allocation II emerges in round one and allocation 
V in round two, with the payoff of each of the b-types rising from 14 to 16 tokens. Yet, with 
just two b-types it would drop from 14 to 12 tokens, ceteris paribus. In general, condition two 
also requires that for each b-type the additional payoff from induced b-type contributions 
(here:  2·Xb)  is  strictly  higher  than  the  private  payoff  which  a  b-type  would  get  from  not 
contributing (here: 5·yi):  
 
  2Xb > 5yi ,  with 
b i b b x n X × =               (7) 
 
Thus, other things being equal, condition two requires that nc Î {1, 2} and nb Î {3, 4}, which 
implies na Î {0, 1}, because of n = 5 = na + nb + nc. Inspection of Table 2 shows that only 
groups 7, 14 and 15 may fulfill this condition.  
Finally, to establish a long-run contribution environment from round three onwards, two 
more conditions must hold, to which I shall refer as conditions three and four. Condition three 
requires that b-types assume that others will mimic their own behavior (third condition). In 
other words, condition three implies that b-types assume their own behavior has an impact on 
the behavior of others. Therefore, they anticipate that others may stop contributing in the 
following round, if they themselves stop contributing. Put differently, they know that if they   13
deviate from contributing in round three the allocation of the first round will re-emerge in 
round  four.  Hence,  although  unilateral  deviating  from  contributing  may  lead  to  a  higher 
payoff in the short-run (here in round three), they anticipate that their unilateral deviating 
would lead to lower payoffs in the long-run (here as of round four) and, therefore, refrain 
from unilateral deviating and continue to contribute.  
The fourth condition states that b-types will not start contributing again, once their first 
attempt  to  establish  a  profitable  long-run  contribution  environment  has  failed  (fourth 
condition). Hence, they contribute in round two, if condition one is fulfilled and they continue 
to contribute as of round three, if conditions two and three are fulfilled. Yet, if this is not the 
case  in  round  two  or  in  any  following  round,  they  will  stop  contributing  and  never  start 
contributing  again  in  any  following  round.  Thus,  condition  four  reinforces  that  b-types 
continue to contribute once conditions two and three prevail, as they anticipate that they may 
not get a re-switch once cooperation has broken down. 
Essentially, the four conditions represent implicit additional constraints which b-types take 
into account in maximizing their long-run payoff. In the following section I demonstrate this 
with a few numerical examples. To summarize, b-type agents will contribute in the long-run 
(i.e., as of round three), if: 
 
#1:   at least one other agent has contributed in round one, 
#2:  the  payoff  in  round  two  (with  contributing)  was  higher  than  in  round  one 
(without contributing), 
#3:  they assume that others will mimic their own behavior and 
#4:  they are not prepared to start contributing again, once their first attempt to 
establish a profitable long-run contribution environment has failed.  
   14
Thus,  the  type  interaction  model  works  as  follows:  In  round  zero  nature  gives  the  type 
distribution in the population of size s. In the first round a group of size n is drawn from the 
population of size s and the number of c-types in this group is revealed because only c-types 
contribute in the first round. In the second round the number of b-types in the group of size n 
is revealed, provided that there is at least one c-type in the group, because in this case all b-
types  contribute  in  the  second  round.  In  the  third  round,  depending  on  whether  type 
interaction is stable or not, either the allocation of the second or the first round, respectively, 
re-emerges. This re-emerged allocation then prevails in all following rounds.  
Finally, it should be emphasized that the type interaction model I have introduced above 
may be viewed as a binary, multi-period extension of the forward-looking approach of Isaac 
et al. (1994, pp. 21-26) and also complies with the approach of Brandts and Schram (2001). 
Holt and Laury (2008) provide an overview.  
 
4. Simulation results  
Based on the predicted contributions for each type of agent, it is now possible to predict the 
long-run allocation for each of the 21 groups in Table 2. The result is displayed in column 
three of Table 2. For example, in group 6 (b,b,b,b,a), allocation I of Table 1 emerges in the 
long-run because in round one none of the five agents will contribute and this situation will 
never change. In other words, if the group contains an empty set of c-types, the public good is 
not provided at all, which is denoted by SAM in column four of Table 2, because this result 
complies with the prediction of the Samuelson model.  
In group 19 (a,a,b,b,c), allocation II emerges in the long-run because in round one the c-
type agent will contribute and, therefore, the b-types will contribute in round two as well. But 
in round three the two b-type agents do not contribute because condition two was not fulfilled 
in round two and because of condition four, allocation II prevails as of round three.  
   15
Table 2: Group compositions, welfare specifications and simulation results 
Group   Allocation  50/40/10  Equal 
No.  Composition      Freq.  Welfare  Freq.  Welfare 
1  a,a,a,a,a  I   SAM  34  1,700  4  200 
2  b,b,b,b,b  I   SAM  10  500  4  200 
3  c,c,c,c,c  VI   C-Pareto  0  0  8  800 
               
4  a,a,a,a,b  I  SAM  150  7,500  32  1,600 
5  a,a,a,a,c  II  SPL  38  2,280  31  1,860 
6  b,b,b,b,a  I  SAM  57  2,850  13  650 
7  b,b,b,b,c  VI  T-Pareto  10  1,000  25  2,500 
8  c,c,c,c,a  V  C-Pareto  0  0  19  1,710 
9  c,c,c,c,b  V  C-Pareto  0  0  24  2,160 
               
10  a,a,a,b,b  I  SAM  251  12,550  39  1,950 
11  a,a,a,c,c  III  SPL  12  840  41  2,870 
12  a,a,a,b,c  II  SPL  121  7,260  96  5,760 
13  b,b,b,a,a  I  SAM  193  9,650  54  2,700 
14  b,b,b,c,c  VI  T-Pareto  5  500  52  5,200 
15  b,b,b,a,c  V  T-Pareto  69  6,210  102  9,180 
16  c,c,c,a,a  IV  C-Pareto  3  240  55  4,400 
17  c,c,c,b,b  IV  C-Pareto  0  0  51  4,080 
18  c,c,c,a,b  IV  C-Pareto  4  320  92  7,360 
               
19  a,a,b,b,c  II  SPL  177  10,620  155  9,300 
20  b,b,c,c,a  III  SPL  30  2,100  159  11,130 
21  c,c,a,a,b  III  SPL  36  2,520  144  10,080 
        1,200  68,640  1,200  85,690 
               
  Layer 1      Layer 2a  Layer 3a  Layer 2b  Layer3b 
  28.57%    SAM  57.92%  50.63%  12.17%  8.52% 
  71.43%    PPL  42.08%  49.37%  87.83%  91.48% 
               
  28.57%    SPL  34.5%  37.33%  52.17%  47.85% 
  28.57%    C-Pareto  0.58%  0.82%  20.75%  23.94% 
  14.29%    T-Pareto  7%  11.23%  14.92%  19.7% 
               
Note:  No.  denotes  the  group  number;  a,  b,  c  denotes  the  behavioral  type  of  the  agent; 
Allocation  (column  three)  denotes  allocations  corresponding  to  those  in  Table  1,  while 
column four indicates the associated long-run welfare specification with C-Pareto denoting a 
Pareto-optimal  allocation  due  to  c-type  contributions,  SAM  denotes  non-provision  as 
predicted by the Samuelson model, SPL denotes suboptimal provision level, and T-Pareto 
denotes a Pareto-optimal allocation due to type interaction; 50/40/10 and Equal denote the 
distribution of a,b,c agents in the population, respectively; Freq. denotes the frequency with 
which each of the 21 groups were drawn and Welfare denotes the actual welfare level in 
terms  of  tokens,  which  results  from  multiplying  the  frequencies  with  the  relevant  overall 
payoff or welfare given in column four of Table 1. Percentage figures at the bottom show the 
relative  shares  with  which  each  welfare  specification  occurs,  with  PPL  denoting  positive 
provision  level  (so  that  SPL,  C-Pareto  and  T-Pareto  are  PPL  sublevels).  For  brevity, 
variances and other statistics are not displayed here.   16
Note that allocations II and III imply a positive but suboptimal provision level (SPL) of the 
public good, which is denoted in column four of Table 2. Moreover, according to Table 1 the 
payoff stream in tokens for each of the two b-types is: 14, 12, 14, 14, …, in rounds one to 
four, respectively. The payoff stream makes it clear that b-types are risking a possible lower 
payoff  in  round  two  (here  12  instead  of  14  tokens,  thus,  two  tokens  forgone  payoff)  in 
exchange for a possible higher payoff in the long-run. However, in this example it turns out 
that the b-types are not rewarded by a higher long-run payoff and, therefore, the two b-types 
do not continue to contribute to the public good as of round three. 
In contrast, in group 15 (b,b,b,a,c), type interaction will lead to allocation V as of round 
three, because the three b-types will start contributing in round two and continue to do so in 
round three and all following rounds because condition two holds (16 tokens > 14 tokens, see 
Table 1 and (7)) and because conditions three and four hold as well. Therefore, according to 
Table 1 the payoff stream in tokens for each of the three b-types is: 14, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, …, 
in rounds one to six, respectively. This payoff stream is also useful for demonstrating that b-
types  maximize  their  long-run  payoff  by  contributing,  if  the  four  conditions  hold.  For 
example, if one of the b-types had instead opted for unilateral deviating in round three, the 
resulting payoff stream in tokens for the deviating b-type would have been: 14, 16, 22, 14, 14, 
14, …, in rounds one to six, respectively. Adding up the payoffs of the first six rounds shows 
that  both  payoff  streams  amount  to  94  tokens.  Thus,  in  this  example,  from  round  seven 
onwards  the  long-run  payoff  from  contributing  exceeds  the  payoff  from  unilateral  free-
riding.
1  
                                                 
1 Discounting is disregarded here because typically in linear public goods games about 10 to 30 rounds are 
played and games take just about 60 to 90 minutes. This notwithstanding, discounting would not alter the main 
conclusions. Also, to give another example, consider group 7 (b,b,b,b,c), Table 2. Other things being equal, the 
payoff stream in tokens for a b-type that deviates in round three is now: 14, 20, 26, 14, 14, 14, …, in rounds one 
to  six,  respectively.  But  if  all  four  conditions  hold  it  is:  14,  20,  20,  20, 20,  20,  …,  in  rounds  one  to  six, 
respectively. In this case the payoff streams are equal after just four rounds (74 tokens) and as of round five the 
long-run payoff from contributing exceeds the payoff from unilateral free-riding.   17
Hence, in group 15 the Pareto-optimal allocation V emerges due to type interaction, which 
is denoted by T-Pareto in column four of Table 2. In cases where a Pareto-optimal allocation 
emerges  already  in  round  one,  because  the  group  contains  three  or  more  c-types,  this  is 
denoted by C-Pareto in column four of Table 2. In this context it is worth noting that the result 
of the Lindahl model complies with either a C-Pareto or a T-Pareto allocation, although there 
is no real bargaining process. Also, the type interaction process effectively transforms the 
pure simultaneous move game into a sequential move game (e.g. see Masclet et al. 2009; 
Farina and Sbriglia 2008; with respect to sequential move games). 
Further inspection of Table 2, columns two and four, shows that non-provision of the 
public good, as predicted by the Samuelson model (SAM), occurs in six cases (≈ 28.57%) of 
the 21 groups, while the remaining 15 groups (≈ 71.43%) have a positive provision level 
(PPL) of the public good. Closer examination of these 15 PPL groups reveals that in six 
groups (≈ 28.57%) the positive provision level is suboptimal (SPL), whereas in the remaining 
nine groups (≈ 42.86%) a Pareto-optimal allocation emerges in the long-run. Also, regarding 
the nine Pareto-optimal cases, in three of these cases (≈ 14.29%) Pareto-optimality is achieved 
by type interaction (T-Pareto), while in the remaining six cases (≈ 28.57%) Pareto-optimality 
is directly achieved by c-type contributions (C-Pareto). The relative shares with which these 
groups occur depend on the number of agent types m, the group size n and the underlying 
public goods model. In the following I refer to these relative shares as layer one shares (see 
Table 2, bottom).  
However,  the  21  groups  may  not  occur  with  the  same  probability.  In  fact,  the  actual 
probability  with  which  these  groups  occur  depends  on  the  distribution  of  types  in  the 
population or subject pool and on the selection criterion with which agents are drawn from the 
population or subject pool to form groups of five. I now assume that there is no specific 
selection procedure or selection bias, so that agents are drawn at random from the population. 
In  this  case,  the  entire  outcome  of  the  process  ceteris  paribus  depends  solely  on  the   18
distribution of agent types within the population. Table 2, column five, shows the frequencies 
with which each group occurs in a simulation based on 1,200 runs, when agent types a, b, and 
c are distributed in proportions of 50, 40 and 10 percent, respectively (see Ledyard 1995, p. 
173).  Likewise,  column  seven  shows  the  same  simulation  when  agent  types  are  equally 
distributed  in  the  population.  The  simulations  have  been  carried  out  with  the  Maple  11 
software package and Maple codes are provided by the author upon request.  
Comparison of the percentage figures at the bottom of Table 2, columns two, five and 
seven, reveals how the initial group weights (column two, layer one) are changed by the 
prevailing distribution of agent types in the population (columns five and seven, layers 2a and 
2b).  Moreover,  column  five  (layer  2a)  and  column  seven  (layer  2b),  show  that  a 
comparatively  small  fraction  of  c-type  agents  (i.e.,  10%  and  33.33%,  respectively)  is 
sufficient to ensure that a substantially higher share of groups exhibits a positive provision 
level (PPL), here 42.08% and 87.83%, respectively. Also, figures in Table 2 suggest that a 
PPL close to 100% would require a share of c-types well below 50%. Put differently, under 
the given circumstances non-provision of public goods is a negligible issue, if the share of c-
types in the population is about 33.33% or higher, but below 50%.   
I now consider a third layer of interest, the welfare in terms of tokens that emerges for 
each simulation, which is shown in Table 2, columns six and eight, respectively. The relevant 
values  are  obtained  from  multiplying  the  frequencies  with  the  relevant  overall  payoff  or 
welfare given in Table 1, column four. Note that this third layer changes the relative shares 
once again, but now the changes are due to the parameters of the underlying public goods 
model. Inspection of Table 2, columns six and eight (layers 3a and 3b), with respect to PPL 
shows that the parameters of the public goods model now raise the share of welfare generated 
in groups with a positive provision level (PPL) to 49.37% and 91.48%, respectively. This 
reinforces the previous finding that under the given circumstances non-provision of public   19
goods is a negligible issue, if the share of c-types in the population is in the range of 33.33% 
or higher. 
Regarding  total  welfare  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  benchmark  level  is  60,000  tokens, 
which is calculated under the assumption that there are no c-types in the population. Hence, in 
this case only allocation I can emerge (SAM groups in Table 2) and total welfare amounts to: 
(1,200 · 50 =) 60,000. Given this benchmark, Table 2, column six (68,640 tokens) and column 
eight  (85,690  tokens),  reveal  that  the  presence  of  c-types  in  the  population  generates 
additional  welfare  of  8,640  tokens  (14.4%)  and  25,690  tokens  (42.82%),  respectively. 
Moreover,  both  values  can  be  separated  in  additional  welfare  generated  from  the  pure 
presence of c-types and from type interaction of b-types and c-types. To do so, one has to bear 
in mind that if type interaction is not possible for some reason, groups 7, 14 and 15 would 
change to SPL specifications, representing allocations II, III and II, respectively. Hence, the 
net welfare effect of type interaction can be calculated from the net welfare difference in 
terms of tokens according to Table 1, (VI-II =) 40, (VI-III =) 30 and (V-II =) 30, respectively, 
multiplied with the relevant frequencies according to Table 2, columns five and seven. These 
procedures  yield  6,020  tokens  (10.03%)  and  20.070  tokens  (33.45%),  respectively,  of 
additional welfare from pure c-type contributions and 2,620 tokens (4.37%) and 5,620 tokens 
(9.37%), respectively, of additional welfare from type interaction.  
In addition, the separation makes it clear that with respect to the third layer, the PPL 
welfare  level  does  not  solely  depend  on  the  c-type  share,  but  also  on  the  b-type  share. 
Therefore, a correction is required to assess the pure impact of the c-type share on welfare 
(i.e. additional welfare from type interaction has to be deducted from both total welfare and 
the PPL welfare level). The correction procedure gives the percentage shares of 47.36% and 
90.88% for welfare generated in groups with a positive provision level due to pure c-type 
presence.  Comparison  with  the  uncorrected  figures  provided  earlier  on  (i.e.  49.37%  and   20
91.48%,  respectively)  shows  that  the  difference  does  not  change  the  conclusion  already 
drawn. 
 
5. Discussion  
The simulation results obtained from the basic type interaction model raise three questions of 
particular interest: 1) What happens if alternative agent type distributions are considered? 2) 
Will the results be influenced by an increase of the group size n?, and 3) What drives the 
results?  
To address the first question, I fix the number of c-types to a certain percentage share and 
then raise the share of b-types ceteris paribus from zero to ninety percent, at the expense of 
the a-type share. This procedure allows for considering any conceivable type distribution and 
Figure 1 shows how total welfare develops for alternative type distributions in the population, 
if the group size n is set to five.  
 
Figure 1: Total welfare for alternative b-type and c-type shares (for n = 5) 
 
Note: Each line in Figure 1 represents a fixed c-type share, where the lowest line represents a 
ten percent c-type share and the highest line represents a ninety percent c-type share. 
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Reading Figure 1 vertically, and fixing the b-type share to zero percent, shows how total 
welfare increases from the benchmark of 60,000 tokens (c-type share of zero percent; a-type 
share of 100 percent) to the maximum of 120,000 tokens (c-type share of 100 percent; a-type 
share of zero percent), if the c-type share is increased stepwise by ten percentage points, at the 
expense of the a-type share. Reading Figure 1 horizontally shows how total welfare increases, 
for each fixed c-type share, if the share of b-types is increased, at the expense of the a-type 
share. Thus, vertically  Figure 1 shows the  c-type effect on total welfare and horizontally 
Figure 1 shows the type interaction effect on total welfare. For example, total welfare of the 
50/40/10 percent simulation shown in Table 2, that is, 68,640 tokens would be represented by 
a dot near the lowest line in Figure 1, at the 40 percent b-type share. Likewise, total welfare of 
the equal shares simulation, that is, 85,690 tokens would be represented by another dot in 
Figure 1, which would be located somewhat above the line that represents the 30 percent c-
type share and somewhat to the right of the 30 percent b-type share.  
To address the second question, I raise the group size ceteris paribus in steps of five from 
n=5  to  n=50  and  consider  the  effect  on  the  layer  3  percentage  shares  of  the  welfare 
specifications (see Table 2, bottom). Results are shown in Figure 2. For example, in Figure 2a 
where the distribution of a-types, b-types and c-types in the population is 50/40/10 percent, 
respectively, the PPL share approaches 100 percent when n is about 35. Essentially the same 
is true for the equal type distribution shown in Figure 2b, but here a group size, n, of about 10 
is already sufficient. If the a-type share is rather high, as in Figure 2c with a type distribution 
of 95/4/1 percent, the PPL share approaches 100 percent only when n is raised to about 500 
(not displayed in Figure 2c). 
With respect to the first three values of the group size, n, that is, 5, 10 and 15, more 
detailed results are also presented in Table 3.    22
Figure 2: Layer 3 shares for alternative group sizes and type distributions 
Figure 2a: 50/40/10 percent distribution  
 
Figure 2b: Equal distribution  
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Figure 2d: 1/4/95 percent distribution  
 
Figure 2e: 0/90/10 percent distribution  
 
Note: Each distribution refers to the percentage shares of agent types in the population, using 
the format (a-types / b-types / c-types). Values of the welfare specifications SAM and PPL are 
provided in bold lines and values of the PPL sub-specifications C-SPL, T-SPL, C-Pareto and 
T-Pareto are displayed by thin lines. The percentage shares refer to the layer 3 (welfare) 
shares provided in Table 2, bottom (just for the first two distributions, Figures 2a and 2b).  
 
 
Moreover,  it  is  important  to  note  that  with  n  ³  7,  SPL  (suboptimal  provision  level) 
specifications must be distinguished into those exclusively due to c-type presence (C-SPL) 
and those where type interaction leads to a higher level of welfare (T-SPL).  
Inspection of Figure 2 and Table 3, in particular with respect to the SAM and PPL shares 
(see  bold  lines  in  Figure  2),  shows  that  the  results  presented  in  the  previous  section  are 
reinforced if n is increased, ceteris paribus. In particular, Figure 2 and Table 3 indicate that 
for any type distribution where the a-type share does not approach 100 percent and the c-type   24
share does not approach zero percent, all welfare will eventually be generated in groups with 
a positive provision level of the public good (PPL), if a sufficiently high n is selected. With 
type  distributions  1/4/95  percent  and  0/90/10  percent,  a  low  n  of  5  and  30,  respectively, 
already yields a 100 percent PPL share.  
Also,  with  respect  to  the  first  four  type  distributions,  Figures  2a  to  2d,  the  positive 
provision level (PPL) eventually consists entirely of T-SPL specifications, with C-SPL, C-
Pareto and T-Pareto specification shares all approaching zero percent. In Figures 2a and 2b, 
this process is already visualized, whereas in Figures 2c and 2d a higher group size, n, of 
about 500 and 1,000, respectively, would be required (not displayed in Figure 2).  
 
Table 3: Layer 3 shares for group sizes of 5, 10 and 15 
Runs=1,200  Distr. 50/40/10  Percent    Distr. Equal 
  n=5  n=10  n=15    n=5  n=10  n=15 
  s=60  s=120  s=180    s=60  s=120  s=180 
sa/sb/sc  30/24/6  60/48/12  90/72/18    20/20/20  40/40/40  60/60/60 
               
Welfare               
Benchmark  60,000  120,000  180,000    60,000  120,000  180,000 
Welfare Level   68,640  238,992  550,860    85,690  340,584  771,828 
Increase in %  14.4%  99.16%  206.03%    42.82%  183.82%  328.79% 
               
SAM  50.63%  16.75%  6.28%    8.52%  0,5%  0.04% 
PPL  49.37%  83.25%  93.72%    91.48%  99.5%  99.96% 
               
C-SPL  37.33%  9.50%  1.21%    47.85%  22.67%  5.28% 
T-SPL  -  66.70%  92.07%    -  44.81%  85.83% 
C-Pareto  0.83%  0%  0%    23.94%  0.3%  0% 
T-Pareto  11.23%  7.05%  0.44%    19.7%  31.72%  8.85% 
Note: The number of runs and the distribution of types are the same as in the Table 2, with 
respect to n=5. The benchmark is denoted in tokens and calculated in the same way as in 
section 4, (i.e., 1,200*the welfare of allocation I, which is here 50, 100 and 150, for n=5, 10 
and 15, respectively). Likewise, the welfare level is denoted in tokens and obtained in the 
same way as in Table 2, with the values for n=5 directly taken from Table 2, bottom, layer 3. 
The percentage increase is directly calculated from the difference between the welfare level 
and the benchmark. With respect to n=10 [n=15], the SAM and PPL (C-SPL, T-SPL, C-
Pareto and T-Pareto) percentage figures are calculated by first working out Table 1 (which 
has  11  [16]  allocations)  and  then  Table  2  (which  has  66  [136]  groups).  Otherwise,  the 
procedure is exactly the same as in Table 2, bottom. Finally, with n ³ 7, SPL (suboptimal 
provision  level)  specifications  must  be  distinguished  into  those  exclusively  due  to  c-type 
presence (C-SPL) and those where type interaction leads to a higher level of welfare (T-SPL). 
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It  must  be  emphasized,  however,  that  although  in  each  of  these  four  cases  the  PPL  is 
eventually dominated by T-SPL specifications, the layer 3 total welfare levels in terms of 
tokens would differ in each case, depending on the exact type distribution. To some extent, 
this is already illustrated in Table 3 for the n = 15 values of the total welfare level (550,860 
tokens versus 770,826 tokens). Furthermore, in contrast to the first four distributions shown in 
Figure 2, the PPL is entirely dominated by T-Pareto specifications for n ³ 5 in Figure 2e, with 
type distribution 0/90/10 percent. 
Finally, Table 3 shows that increasing returns are clearly present. For example, multiplying 
n, sa, sb, and sc with factor 2 raises total welfare by factor 3.48 in case of the 50/40/10 percent 
distribution (i.e., from 68,640 to 238,992 tokens) and by factor 3.97 in case of the equal 
shares distribution (i.e., from 85,690 to 340,584 tokens). 
To summarize, if the group size n is sufficiently large, then, for any type distribution 
where all three agent types a, b, c have a positive percentage share in the population, the 
percentage share of SAM specifications will approach zero and all welfare will be generated 
in groups that show a PPL specification. In addition, the PPL will be eventually dominated by 
T-SPL specifications. These two critical group sizes, nPPL and nT-SPL, may or may not coincide 
(see Figure 2). Likewise, if the a-type share is zero and the b-type and c-type shares are both 
positive,  all  welfare  will  again  be  generated  in  groups  that  show  a  PPL  specification. 
However, the PPL will now be dominated by T-Pareto specifications rather than by T-SPL 
specifications.  Again,  these  two  critical  group  sizes,  nPPL  and  nT-Pareto,  may  or  may  not 
coincide (see Figure 2). Put differently, all welfare will be generated in groups where no 
public good is provided (SAM specifications), only if either the a-type share in the population 
is 100 percent or the b-type share is 100 percent or if the a-type and b-type shares add up to 
100 percent.   
To address the third question of what drives the results, I now consider the conditions for 
the occurrence of each welfare specification, subject to the prevailing public goods model of   26
section 2. These conditions are summarized in Table 4, for SAM and for the PPL sublevels C-
SPL, T-SPL, C-Pareto and T-Pareto. Moreover, they are provided for group sizes of 5, 10 and 
15 and in generalized form for the relevant cases of n > 2. Inspection of Table 4 shows that 
these conditions address the group composition, that is, how many b-types and/or c-types are 
required or allowed in a group of size n, so that a certain welfare specification may actually 
occur.  For  example,  with  respect  to  n  =  5,  the  conditions  yield  the  group  composition 
requirements discussed above in section 3 and comply with the group compositions shown for 
each welfare specification in Table 2, column two (with SPL in Table 2 referring to C-SPL in 
Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Group composition conditions for each welfare specification  
Group Size  n = 5  n = 10  n = 15    n > 2 
           
SAM  nc = 0  nc = 0  nc = 0    nc = 0 
           
PPL           
           
C-SPL  0 < nc £ 2 
nb £ 2 
0 < nc £ 7 
nb £ 2 
0 < nc £ 12 
nb £ 2 
  0 < nc £ (n-3) 
nb £ 2 
           
T-SPL  ---  0 < nc £ 4 
nb ³ 3 
nc + nb £ 7 
0 < nc £ 9 
nb ³ 3 
nc + nb £ 12 
  0 < nc £ (n-6) 
nb ³ 3 
nc + nb £ (n-3) 
           
C-Pareto  nc ³ 3  nc ³ 8  nc ³ 13    nc ³ (n-2) 
           
T-Pareto  0< nc £ 2 
nb ³ 3 
--- 
0 < nc £ 7 
nb ³ 3 
nc + nb ³ 8 
0 < nc £ 12 
nb ³ 3 
nc + nb ³ 13 
  0 < nc £ (n-3) 
nb ³ 3 
nc + nb ³ (n-2) 
Note: SAM denotes non-provision of the public good, PPL denotes a positive provision level 
of the public good, C-SPL denotes supoptimal provision level due to c-type presence, T-SPL 
denotes supoptimal provision level due to type interaction, C-Pareto denotes Pareto-optimal 
provision level due to c-type presence and T-Pareto denotes Pareto-optimal provision level 
due to type interaction, and nb, nc denote the number of b-types and c-types, respectively, in a 
group of n agents. 
 
 
Table 4 also shows that for the SAM and C-Pareto specifications only one condition applies, 
whereas two conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously for C-SPL specifications and even   27
three  conditions  must  hold  simultaneously  for  stable  type  interaction  (i.e.,  T-SPL  and  T-
Pareto specifications). Further, some conditions depend on the group size n, but others do not 
and  for  some  welfare  specifications  just  the  c-type  share  matters,  whereas  for  other 
specifications both the c-type and the b-type share matters. The group composition conditions 
provided in Table 4 fully explain the results shown in Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 2 and 3 and 
they can be used to assess ceteris paribus the expected results of any other conceivable type 
distribution and/or group size.  
For example, consider Figure 2d with an agent type distribution of 1/4/95 percent. With a 
low group size, the probability that the C-Pareto condition, nc ³ (n-2), is fulfilled is virtually 
one (see Figure 2d, n£10). Yet, as the group size increases ceteris paribus the occurrence of 
either a-types or b-types in a group becomes more likely and, thus, it is less likely that the C-
Pareto condition can be fulfilled. Eventually, as n increases further, the probability that C-
Pareto specifications occur at all approaches zero. Moreover, even the probability that Pareto-
optimal  specifications  (C-Pareto  and  T-Pareto)  occur  at  all  becomes  zero,  because  the 
expected number of a-types in each group becomes sufficiently high to prevent both the C-
Pareto condition, nc ³ (n-2), and the T-Pareto condition, nc + nb ³ (n-2). In contrast, if the a-
type share is zero and both the b-type and c-type shares are positive, as in Figure 2e with 
agent type distribution of 0/90/10 percent, all welfare will eventually be generated in groups 
that show a T-Pareto specification, if the group size is sufficiently large.  
Furthermore, with respect to type interaction in general (see Table 4, T-SPL and T-Pareto), 
it is worth noting that the first conditions, 0 < nc £ (n-6) and 0 < nc £ (n-3), are fulfilled ceteris 
paribus for any positive share of both b-types and c-types if n is sufficiently large and the c-
type share does not approach 100 percent. The second condition, nb ³ 3, is the same for all n 
due to equation (7). Hence, with either a higher share of b-types or a higher group size n (or 
both taken together), the probability that this condition is fulfilled increases ceteris paribus. 
Also, the third condition for either a T-SPL or T-Pareto specification, nc + nb £ (n-3) and nc +   28
nb ³ (n-2), respectively, are complements so that one of them always holds. Therefore, all 
welfare will eventually be generated in groups where type interaction (T-SPL or T-Pareto 
specifications) prevails, provided that the population contains non-empty sets of b-types and 
c-types and the group size n is sufficiently large. 
Finally, the simulation results presented in section 4 and the discussion in this section 
clearly indicate that ethical education, by which c-types [b-types] may be ‘produced’ from 
either a-types or b-types [a-types] using capital and labor as inputs, may not only be beneficial 
for society as a whole, but has also a potential for economies of scale. Notably, the reverse is 
also true, that is, a collapse of moral order or ethical behavior patterns may cause excessive 
harm to society as a whole. Of course, many other aspects of the basic type interaction model 
could be examined in further detail. However, I shall leave these tasks to the interested reader 
because the essential points have already been made clear and can be summarized as follows: 
 
(iii)  In any population that contains a non-empty set of ethically motivated agents 
(c-types),  non-provision  of  public  goods  is  a  negligible  issue,  if  the 
circumstances described above prevail and the group size is sufficiently large. 
 
(iv)  Ethical education may be welfare enhancing and could generate economies of 
scale over certain ranges, if type interaction among enlightened selfish agents 
(b-types) and ethically motivated agents (c-types) is possible. 
 
These findings have a number of policy implications. For example, the private provision of 
public  goods  by  ethically  motivated  agents  and  via  type  interaction  may  to  some  extent 
replace public goods provision by government through a political process. Also, in some cases 
it may even turn out that a political decision to raise the level of ethical education is more 
efficient with respect to the desired level of public goods than a political process that aims   29
directly at the public goods provision level. Further, rather than representing an individual 
agent, the three behavioral types may represent social interest groups who are interacting in a 
political process over public goods provision. Areas of interest could be environmental or 
social security insurance issues, where some interest groups may represent members with 
myopic selfish views, while others my hold enlightened selfish views and still others may be 
ethically motivated.  
 
6. Extensions 
The basic model can be extended in many ways to capture the complexity of human behavior 
and  relevant  decision  environments.  In  these  cases,  a  simulation  approach  has  clear 
advantages and the simulation results obtained from the basic type interaction model may 
serve as a benchmark. Therefore, I shall briefly discuss some extensions of the basic type 
interaction model. 
E1 – Type diversification: The basic model is limited to just three behavioral types. Real 
human  behavior  patterns,  however,  are  much  richer  and  diverse.  Hence,  one  could  either 
assume additional types or differentiate the three existing types a, b, c into sub-types. For 
example, it could be interesting to change the implicit conditional cooperation parameters of 
some of the b-types. In the basic model I assumed that the parameter value for the individual 
willingness  to  contribute,  γ,  was  “one  other  agent”,  implying  that  all  b-types  would  start 
contributing once they observed that at least one other agent had contributed in the preceding 
round. Now assume that there are some b-types, say b0-types, for which γ = 0 holds, meaning 
that they would contribute even if no other agent has contributed previously. Thus, in round 
one, b0-types and c-types would now contribute, which makes it clear that b0-types may 
effectively  fulfill  the  same  role  for  type  interaction  as  the  c-types  do.  Note  that  this  has 
important consequences insofar as b0-types may substitute for c-types and, therefore, type 
interaction may take place even if there are just b-types. Hence, if a b0-type shows up in   30
group 2 or 6 the SAM allocation would be changed to a T-Pareto allocation. In addition, b1-
types, b2-types, etc. could be introduced, where the b1-type coincides with the standard b-
type of the basic model.  
Moreover, sub-type variations could be based on other implicit parameters of the basic 
type interaction model. For example, the individual willingness to wait until condition two is 
fulfilled, q, which was set to just one round in the basic model, could be changed for some b-
types to two rounds or more. Note that this change would on the one hand serve as a reaction 
buffer if some agents make mistakes, while on the other hand it would allow for the evolution 
of cooperation over various rounds, if some b-types start contributing only if the average 
contribution of others reaches certain threshold levels. Other examples include the individual 
willingness to deviate from contributing, d, which was set to one agent in the basic type 
interaction model due to condition three (i.e., if one agent is observed to deviate, all others 
deviate as well). Furthermore, b-types may differ in their beliefs about other’s willingness to 
deviate, f, which was also set to one agent in the basic model, or b-types could differ with 
respect to their individual willingness to re-initiate a type interaction process, l. In the basic 
model this parameter was captured with condition four and was set to zero attempts (which 
implies  no  re-switches).  If  for  some  agents  this  parameter  is  raised  to  positive  levels, 
conditional cooperation patterns could be re-started once cooperation has collapsed for some 
reason. Note, that this would allow for incorporating learning procedures, if a breakdown of 
successful type interaction leads to adjustments with respect to other individual parameter 
values. 
E2 – Other forms of cooperation: The basic type interaction model rests on a very simple 
form of conditional cooperation, where b-type agents react to a signal which is based on a 
positive provision level in the previous round. Many other forms of conditional cooperation 
and type communication are conceivable. For example, one could give up the notion that the 
group of five takes the decision to contribute or not simultaneously in each round and assume   31
instead that group members take the decision in a sequential manner. In this case, and in 
contrast to the basic model, both the permutation of types within the group and the order with 
which agents are called to take their decision matters. Furthermore, in line with a typical 
agent-based modeling feature, one could assume that agents look at the behavior of other 
agents in their neighborhood. For example, b-types may just consider what their immediate 
neighbor to the left and (or) to the right has done in the previous round. Note that in this case 
the row vector of agents has to be interpreted as a circle on which the agents are placed. In 
agent-based modeling such a circle is known as a ‘ring world’ (e.g. see Epstein and Axtell 
1996, pp. 170–176). Also, the visibility parameter could be raised to more than one neighbor, 
which is particularly interesting in larger groups. In this context it is worth mentioning that 
the form of conditional cooperation I have introduced in section 3 complies with a ring world 
where visibility is set to n-1 agents. 
Of course, many more variants and other extensions are conceivable, but the suggestions 
discussed above are already sufficient to illustrate the potential of the basic type interaction 
model.   
 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
In  this  paper  I  have  shed  some  light  on  the  role  ethical  behavior  patterns  may  play  in 
providing  public  goods.  In  particular,  I  assumed  that  the  population  contained  three 
behavioral types: myopic selfish agents (a-types), enlightened selfish agents (b-types) and 
ethically motivated agents (c-types). I then analyzed the impact which alternative distributions 
of these agent types in the population may have by using an agent-based simulation approach 
and  a  standard  linear  public  goods  model.  In  contrast  to  the  black-box  approach  usually 
employed in  agent-based modeling, this procedure  allowed me to identify three layers of 
interest and to calculate for each layer the relative shares of the welfare specifications SAM   32
(non-provision of the public good) and PPL (positive provision level of the public good), 
together with the relative shares of relevant PPL sub-specifications. 
With respect to the first two layers (group composition and frequency) only the share of c-
types in the population matters, because the PPL share does not change if type interaction is 
impossible so that T-Pareto [T-SPL] allocations become SPL [C-SPL] allocations. For both 
layers and for both simulations, it was shown in Table 2 that the PPL share was well in excess 
of the share of c-types in the population. Moreover, this observation holds true if the third 
layer (welfare) is considered and corrections are taken to assess the pure impact of the c-type 
share.  Further,  they  continue  to  hold  and  may  even  be  reinforced  if  alternative  type 
distributions  and  higher  group  sizes  are  considered,  as  demonstrated  in  section  5.  These 
findings clearly indicate that non-provision of public goods, as predicted by the Samuelson 
model, can be substantially reduced by even a small fraction of ethical motivated agents in the 
population and that it can be eliminated for any type distribution that contains a non-empty set 
of c-types, if the group size n is sufficiently large. It must be emphasized, however, that 
Samuelson (1954, p. 389) himself already recognized that Kantian behavior patterns would 
lead  to  different  results.  Yet,  it  might  not  have  been  entirely  clear  that  it  may  well  be 
sufficient if just a few actually show such behavior patterns.  
In addition, the increase of welfare in terms of tokens due to type interaction and the 
possible high share of welfare generated in groups that show a C-Pareto or T-Pareto provision 
level indicates that ethical education is not only beneficial for society as a whole, but may also 
generate economies of scale over certain ranges. Put differently, although ethically motivated 
behavior patterns may not be explained by even the broadest definition of self-interest and, 
therefore,  may  remain  alien  to  any  economics  framework  (see  Pickhardt  2006b,  2005b; 
Wilber  2004),  such  behavior  patterns  can  play  an  important  role  in  welfare  enhancing 
procedures. Recently, this latter point has been stressed with respect to the role moral order 
plays for the efficient working of market economies (e.g. see Petrick and Pies 2007).   33
Of course, the extensions discussed in section 6 would move the analysis much closer to 
real world decision environments, which in turn would lead to additional layers and findings. 
Moreover, an extended version of the basic type interaction model may serve as a tool, for 
example,  to  test  the  findings  from  the  agent-based  model  in  an  experiment  with  human 
subjects, to replicate results obtained from other experiments with human subjects, to gain 
new insights by comparing and contrasting results from such experiments and agent-based 
set-ups, and to complement findings from experiments with human subjects by investigating 
aspects that cannot (or just with difficulties) be done in these experiments (see also Duffy 
2006). But this rather delineates a future research agenda.  
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